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hope to see the psychological laboratory and the psychological clinic at the foundation of all education.

*E W. Scripture*

*Yale University*

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## APPERCEPTION

The relation of the world of mind to the world of matter has long been, and still is, a subject for discussion. The theory that essence from material objects passes through the nerves of the special senses, enters the soul, and in some way forms an image upon it, has about disappeared. At present, the tendency of belief seems to be towards an inner principle, or activity, which reacts upon external activity. Every reflecting being is no doubt conscious of this inner activity, though no one is very clear as to its nature.

The reaction of inner against outer activity, may be regarded as a kind of resistance, and consequently as an expression of force generated by physical excitation.

A result of the reaction mentioned is the formation of a product in the soul, which is supposed, at some stage of its existence, to convey to the intelligence some information concerning the nature of the external world. In popular language this product is called an image, or picture of an object which is in the external world. Whether the exact nature of the external world is thus revealed to the intelligence, however, has not been, and perhaps cannot be, determined. So far as we can judge, the internal response in no way resembles anything in the so-called external world. At best, the intelligence, in consequence of a consciousness of a set of internal sensations, can only assume the existence of a set of external manifestations. The internal activity must be aroused before the assumption can be made.

The individual who has no sensation of light can assume nothing regarding the color of an object. The consciousness of the former is an indication of the possible existence of the

latter. Thus it may be shown that our apprehension of the nature of the external world is but relative. It varies from day to day in the same individual ; and who shall say whether the apprehension of yesterday or that of to-day is the true one ? Furthermore, no two individuals apprehend the same object in exactly the same way, any more than they attach the same meanings to a word. The differences in the apprehension of different people, in regard to the same object are due to the differences in the psychical reactions, as well as to the differences in the physical excitations.

The earlier psychical experiences influence the later ones, and as the earlier experiences of individuals differ from one another, so do their later apprehensions of the world around them differ from one another.

Who can say which one among these various apprehensions is the most correct ?

Also, past apprehensions of phenomena determine the present apprehension of the same phenomena. In so far as the individual is aided by his past experience, his present view is modified, *i. e.* extended or corrected. Also, an opinion entertained in the past may be extended or corrected by a new experience.

A totally new apprehension is generally due to a rearrangement of old psychical products by means of which rearrangement new thought is generated. This new thought is employed in an extended apprehension of external phenomena. In this as in other cases, the latest apprehension is determined by previous views of the same subject.

This theory is supported by numberless sayings which have passed into proverbs, *e. g.*, "We see with all that we have seen," "We only learn what we know," "One finds in Rome only that which one takes there."

Every attempt of one individual to communicate with another is an illustration of the same theory. A speaker seeking to convey his thought to a hearer begins by calling into the consciousness of the latter some past experience or thought similar

to that which he is about to present. The purpose is to secure the conditions for the understanding of the new thought which is to be presented. The process by which the new or the unknown experience is thus taken possession of, and translated into the terms of the old, or the known, experience is called apperception.

The more formal definition which is generally given, merely indicates the acts by which the understanding of the unknown is generally effected, *e. g.*, The process by which one concept or set of concepts is appropriated by another concept or set of concepts is called apperception.

We may observe that the definition provides not only for the apprehension of the new psychical product through the old, but for the apprehension of the unknown [whether old or new] through the known. It thus provides for a further apperception, or apprehension of that which has been already apperceived, and implies the possibility of the intelligence going beyond the limits of the recognition of the concrete, and of rising to an apprehension of the abstract, and even to an understanding of an abstraction of an abstraction, thus rendering possible the realization of pure thought into which the concrete may not enter.

Here a question arises regarding the relation of apperception to sense-perception. To some the two processes appear to be opposed. In reality sense-perception is a preparation for apperception. Sense-perception is the process by which sensations are combined into a larger product—*i. e.* the concrete or particular concept, or idea,—while apperception is the process by which this product becomes combined with a reproduced product similar to itself.

Sense-perception implies a more primitive condition of psychic activity than apperception, but it is in no way less important or less necessary than the latter. Without sense-perception, there would be no apperception, as there would be no apperceiving concepts, and no concepts to be apperceived. As a matter of fact, there is a point where sense-perception can

hardly be distinguished from apperception. Sense-perception is sometimes described as the process by which a sensation is referred to its cause in the external world. This implies an act of recognition which is the first stage of understanding, and hence belongs to apperception.

In this connection, we may mention the relation of observation to apperception. Generally observation is regarded as the work of the organs of special sense. We frequently hear teachers talk of cultivating the senses through observation. It is doubtful whether any organ of the body is in itself more capable of cultivation than is any other machine. Use, within certain limits, may make the machine more supple, *i. e.*, it may adjust the parts to one another in such a way that resistance is lessened, and time thus saved, but the machine is not otherwise improved. Use or exercise cannot do more than this for any of the organs of sense.

As the mental activity gains in power through connected thinking, however, it becomes more and more capable of directing the attention, and so uses its tools, the senses, with more and more skill, thus gaining more through them in a given time than the crude, uncultured mind can do. The eye of an eagle is probably a better organ than the eye of a man. Also the eagle probably exercises its eye quite as much as a man does, yet the observing power of the eagle is very much lower than that of a man.

In itself, observation is the work of the intelligence, and depends for its effectiveness upon the apperceptive capability of the individual. The more a man understands the more he is capable of observing in the line in which he understands. The astronomer sees in the heavens phenomena which are not revealed to the eye of one who is ignorant of astronomy. In a single glance at a plant, the botanist sees more than the man who is ignorant of botany would see in a day's study. One can not be said either to see or to hear that which one does not understand.

Practically, observation is apperception, and training in power to observe can only mean training in power to understand. Those who have dealt with children and young people know well that they hear only that which they really understand. They only collect and hold sounds in mind to the extent that they apperceive them. In regard to seeing, facts are similar. Much that meets the eye of the individual who is mentally untrained passes before it without making the slightest impression, simply because the person can not bring his mind to bear upon it.

To talk of training the senses or the body except as the mind is trained, and thus made capable of directing the former, is useless. Manual and physical instruction have mental development in view quite as much as have instruction in literature and history.

The work of sense-perception is to secure through the agency of the external world, the material which may be apperceived by reproduced concepts, and which having been apperceived becomes apperceiving material for new products. The process here indicated is known as the lower or outer apperception.

By reflection the mass of apperceived concepts is reproduced, and rearranged in such a way as will make possible a new apperception of that which has been apperceived already. By this means an increased understanding of the old material is secured. This old or known material is related to many groups of concepts with which it did not come into contact in the first apperception. Through new and extended apperceptions, new views of concrete phenomena are secured, and new psychical products are formed which have no counterpart in the external world. The perception of abstract truth arises first from a consciousness of the relations existing between concrete phenomena. These abstract concepts are apperceived by abstract concepts similar to themselves. Out of the combinations here implied other and higher abstractions are evolved. The process employed under this and similar conditions is known as outer or higher apperception.

Lower and higher apperception may be regarded as covering all psychical acts of which understanding is the result,—from the first psychical reaction against sense-perception which involves recognition, through all acts of interpretation and even of creation. This last includes the forming of the general notion by combining the characteristics common to all the members of a class of individuals or particulars.

In the light of lower apperception we may again refer to the expression “training the observation.” The exercise of the observation is generally regarded as the work of sense-perception ; but inasmuch as the work of observing is a work of recognizing, observing is really a process of apperceiving, and has value only to the extent that the intelligence or the understanding is trained. This is evidenced by the fact that a very young child or an individual of feeble intelligence cannot be made to observe carefully and continuously. If apperception be not taking place at the time of observing, the physical senses can be exercised with but little effect. Apperception insures psychical activity, and implies the retention of a product in consciousness long enough for recognition to take place.

Apperception renders the senses susceptible to the thousands of excitations which are constantly overlooked by persons of limited experience and limited intelligence. We perceive with the intelligence rather than with the eye and the ear.

While the lower apperception is an absolutely essential foundation for the higher, in itself it is a primitive process. It secures little, if anything, beyond the recognition and interpretation of new concrete products. It deals with concrete particulars rather than with concrete generals.

Abundant examples of lower apperception are to be found in the similes and metaphors in minor poetry, and in the lesser literary works of the day, when one concrete concept is translated into terms of another concrete concept. The writer who calls “dew drops” “diamonds”—the “moon” a “silver boat,”

—the “stars” “lamps of heaven,”—the poet who “heard the trailing garments of the night sweep through her marble halls,” may make graceful interpretations, but on this ground at least can not lay claim to the creative power of the artist.

The power to rise from the apprehension of concrete phenomena to the apprehension of abstract general truth implies the exercise of the higher apperception, while the power to make that truth apparent to the intelligence of another implies the creative power of the artist in the true sense of the word.

Examples of the exercise of the higher apperception are to be found in such writings as the *Don Quixote* of Cervantes, Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, etc. Similar examples may be found in other departments of art, *e. g.* in architecture, sculpture, painting, music, the drama, etc.

In addition to the higher apperceptive power as shown in the fine arts—so-called—the same may be observed in theories of invention and discovery, which theories are perhaps more truly creations than the former. Theories of invention and discovery require quite as much knowledge of law, and quite as accurate judgment as do theories of art production.

We may mention here that the apprehension of abstract general notions is only reached by the human intellect by a passage through concrete particulars.

The importance of a thorough knowledge of apperception on the part of the teacher can hardly be overestimated. The principle of apperception, *viz.* : the relation of similarity, is that upon which the possibility of instruction depends. Every teacher who has succeeded in opening a line of communication between himself and his pupil has recognized the necessity for basing new information upon that which the child already possesses, while he has found invariably that previous experience furnishes a basis for understanding, which in its turn arouses attention and renews effort.

The direct result of the blending of similar concepts is the generation of pleasant feeling which underlies involuntary attention and immediate interest.



One who has observed the pleasure of a child in hearing the same story repeated, and his displeasure and even grief at changes or omissions, will readily understand the pleasure that arises from apperception. Probably in every case unpleasant feeling is due to failure to apperceive, *i. e.*, failure to understand.

The power to apperceive abstract truth marks the superiority of man over the brute. The brute is dependent upon the world around it and upon the present. The past is of little if any service to it beyond that it aids in the recognition of objects. The human being is free to rearrange his past experiences, and to evolve from them new forms of thought by means of which he is able to select from new psychical products that which will be of service to him, and to reject that which is calculated to be a hindrance. Thus he becomes master of the world to the extent that he can apperceive it, and so becomes more and more independent of it. Through the power of apperception, he tames the forces of nature and makes them do his will.

The continuous work of comparing and blending similar concepts, implied in apperception imparts steadiness and strength to the mental life. Through it the whole mass of past experiences is made ready for use at a moment's notice. The individual who possesses a well-arranged, logically connected stock of experiences is never a prey to the chances of circumstances. He is able to meet the unexpected, and to make it his. If, however, the mass of past experiences be not well-arranged and classified upon the basis of similarity, later apperceptions must be necessarily crude and incomplete. Probably no amount of care in later life can make up for lack of careful apperception in the early life of the child. Failing this care in the early life, fine and close discriminations on the part of the adult are well nigh impossible. The defect is indicated in crude and hasty judgments, together with inappropriate, inefficient, and inadequate action, which must of necessity be sub-

jected to constant change and correction without any material improvement.

The most aggravated cases of such failure may be observed in persons who are incapable of sustained effort in any direction.

The effect of apperception upon the character must not be overlooked. Habitual, thorough apperception of experiences, together with careful reflection upon the same,—during which reflection higher apperception must take place,—insures clear insight, steadfast, reliable judgment, and effective, well-timed action.

Some one has said that all the mistakes in the world arise from insufficient observation. Perhaps we may say more correctly that all the mistakes in the world arise from insufficient or incomplete apperception.

The man who apperceives is the man who delays judgment until he can relate his new experiences to the mass of known products that are similar to the new. Having brought the new product into its right relations with the whole, he is able to pronounce upon it correctly and with authority.

The power to relate correctly, and to judge accurately, imparts stability to the character, and secures that organic firmness, suppleness, subtlety, adaptability, and individuality, which we call culture. Such culture secures its possessor against awkwardness, or embarrassment, and enables him to meet all emergencies with tranquility and repose.

*Margaret K. Smith*

*Oswego Normal School*

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## PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY

If the relationship of psychology and pedagogy is not a burning question, it is at least a phosphorescent question. We meet it everywhere. The department of pedagogy in universities has courses in psychology, the instructor at Teachers' Institutes has his lecture on psychology, and the educational journals, even those for public school teachers, have